

# Activation in the neural network responsible for categorization and recognition reflects parameter changes

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According to various influential formal models of cognition, perceptual categorization and old–new recognition recruit the same memory system. By contrast, the prevailing view in the cognitive neuroscience literature is that separate neural systems mediate perceptual categorization and recognition. A direct form of evidence is that separate brain regions are activated when observers engage in categorization and recognition tasks involving the same types of stimuli. However, even if the same memory-based comparison processes underlie categorization and recognition, one would not expect to see identical patterns of brain activity across the tasks; the reason is that observers would adjust parameter settings (e.g., vary criterion settings) across the tasks to satisfy the different task goals. In this fMRI study, we conducted categorization and recognition tasks in which stimulus conditions were held constant, and in which observers were induced to vary hypothesized parameter settings across conditions. A formal exemplar model was fitted to the data to track the changes in parameters to help interpret the fMRI results. We observed systematic effects of changes in parameters on patterns of brain activity, which were interpretable in terms of differing forms of evidence accumulation that resulted from the changed parameter settings. After controlling for stimulus and parameter-related differences, we found little evidence that categorization and recognition recruit separate memory systems.

Among the most fundamental cognitive processes are categorization and old–new recognition (1). In categorization, observers make decisions about whether distinct objects belong to the same class (2). By contrast, in recognition, observers judge whether each test object is an exact match to some study object. Despite the difference in task goals, various theories posit that categorization and recognition rely on similar memory representations and cognitive processes (3–7). For example, according to an influential exemplar model of categorization (5–7), which will serve as an analytic tool in the present research, people store individual exemplars in memory, and make categorization and recognition decisions on the basis of how similar test objects are to the exemplars. The model has provided excellent quantitative accounts of categorization and recognition choice probabilities and response times in numerous experiments (7–10).

However, this single-memory system exemplar model has also been challenged on grounds of various dissociations observed between categorization and recognition (11). For example, various influential studies demonstrated that amnesic subjects with poor recognition memory show normal categorization performance, suggesting that separate neural memory systems may mediate the tasks (12–16). Nevertheless, formal modeling has indicated that even these dissociations are consistent with the predictions from the exemplar model (4, 17–19). The general approach in the modeling was to assume that amnesics have reduced ability to discriminate among distinct exemplar traces. This reduced memorial discriminability is particularly detrimental to recognition, which may require the observer to make fine-grained distinctions between old vs. new items. However, as illustrated in

the modeling, the reduced discriminability is not very detrimental to categorization, which may require only gross-level assessments of similarity to be made.

A more direct challenge to the exemplar hypothesis comes from brain imaging studies that show that distinct brain regions are activated across recognition vs. categorization tasks (11, 20–23). In a seminal study, Reber et al. (22) conducted categorization tasks in which subjects were presented with statistical distortions of a dot-pattern prototype (24). Following study, subjects were tested with new distortions of the category prototype and with patterns from an unstudied category. In a comparison recognition task, subjects studied five random dot patterns, and then were tested on these five old patterns and new random patterns. Dramatically different patterns of brain activity were observed across the categorization and recognition test phases. In the categorization task, category members were associated with decreased activity in posterior occipital cortex (POC). By contrast, in the recognition task, the old patterns led to increased activity in POC and a variety of other brain regions associated with explicit memory.

Although these differences suggest that categorization and recognition may indeed recruit separate memory systems, alternative possibilities need to be considered. First, note that different stimuli were presented across the tasks. In categorization, subjects endorsed novel patterns that were similar to a single prototype, whereas in recognition they endorsed highly distinct patterns that were exact matches to unrelated, old study items. Thus, rather than reflecting differences in categorization vs. recognition per se, the brain imaging results may have been reflecting these stimulus differences. Second, even if stimulus conditions are held constant, and even if the same basic exemplar similarity processes guide performance, one would still expect to see differences in brain activity across typical versions of the tasks; from a formal perspective, the reason is that subjects would be expected to change parameter settings across the tasks to satisfy the different task goals (6, 7, 9). For example, in recognition, an observer endorses a test item only if it is an exact match to a study item. By contrast, in categorization, a test item is endorsed if it has sufficient similarity to the study items; exact matches are not required. Thus, observers would be expected to vary criterion settings for similarity matching across the tasks, with a much stricter criterion being adopted in recognition than in categorization. Therefore, differences in brain activation across categorization vs. recognition need not be explained in terms of qualitatively different memory systems. An alternative is

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that there are quantitative changes in the same cognitive systems. Those quantitative differences reflect changes in parameter settings, such as a shift in criterion for the level of similarity required to endorse a pattern.

In the present study, we address these issues in two ways. First, we conduct brain imaging of categorization and recognition in which stimulus conditions are held constant, with only the task goal being manipulated. Second, we use an instructional manipulation to vary hypothesized parameter settings across conditions, to study how such parameter changes may be implemented in the brain. A formal exemplar model is fitted to the behavioral data to track these hypothesized changes in parameter settings and to help interpret the brain-imaging results.

### Tasks

We acquired blood oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD) measurements of brain activation using fMRI while subjects performed a series of categorization and recognition tasks. In all tasks, subjects studied five high-statistical distortions of a novel dot-pattern prototype. At test, subjects were presented with: (i) the old high distortions, (ii) new distortions of the prototype at both low and high distortion levels, and (iii) new random patterns that were unrelated to the prototype. Examples are provided in Fig. 1A. In a recognition task (REC), subjects were instructed to endorse a test pattern only if it was old, i.e., an exact match to one of the study patterns. In a categorization task (CAT), subjects were told that they had just experienced members of a single category, and should endorse a test pattern if it was also a member of the category. The instructions made clear that both old and new category members would be presented and that both should be endorsed. Note that the types of study and test stimuli were identical across the CAT and REC conditions, with only the task goal varying. In addition, to hold stimulus-encoding strategies during the study phase constant across conditions (25), subjects were not informed of the detailed task instructions until time of test. Our focused question in this investigation was whether the task goal of categorizing vs. recognizing at time of test, in and of itself, leads to reliance on separate neural memory systems.

Finally, to assess the role of parameter change in influencing the brain imaging results, we also conducted a lax recognition task (LAX). Subjects were given recognition instructions, but the instructions emphasized that it was important to not miss any old items, whereas false alarms to new items were relatively unimportant. The intent was to induce subjects to adopt a lax criterion for making their recognition judgments, and pilot testing revealed that the behavioral data for this LAX condition were

similar to those in the CAT condition. Thus, the LAX condition is similar to the REC condition in the sense that the task goal is to recognize, but is similar to the CAT condition in terms of the hypothesized parameter settings from the exemplar model (see below).

### Behavioral and Modeling Results

The probability with which subjects endorsed the different pattern types across the three tasks is displayed in Fig. 1B. Across all three tasks, subjects endorsed the old items with the highest probability, followed in order by the new low distortions, the new high distortions, and the random patterns. Also, the behavioral data were highly similar across the CAT and LAX conditions, but endorsement probabilities were lower in the REC condition.

We fitted these data using a baseline version of the exemplar model (17). According to the model, the probability that each pattern type  $i$  is endorsed in each condition  $j$  is given by

$$P(i, j) = S_i / (S_i + K_j), \quad [1]$$

where  $S_i$  is the summed similarity of pattern type  $i$  to the old study exemplars, and  $K_j$  is a criterion parameter for condition  $j$ . To compute the summed similarities, we estimate free parameters  $s_L$ ,  $s_H$ , and  $s_R$ , representing the average similarity of the low-distortion, high-distortion, and random patterns to the old study exemplars. (For scaling convenience, the similarity of an old item to itself is set equal to  $s_O = 1.0$ .) The general version of the exemplar model presumes that selective attention processes may modify similarity relations across different tasks (5–7). For the present types of dot patterns, however, we expect that the role of this selective attention process is relatively minor. Therefore, for simplicity, we assume that the similarity parameters  $s_L$ ,  $s_H$ , and  $s_R$  are constant across the CAT, REC, and LAX conditions. Finally, we estimate the criterion setting ( $K_j$ ) for each task  $j$ , which we assume is the only parameter that varies across tasks.

The predictions from the model (solid dots) are shown with the observed data in Fig. 1B. The model achieves good fits to the data of all three tasks, in accord with the hypothesis that performance may be mediated by the same exemplar-based retrieval system. The best-fitting parameters, reported in Table 1, are easily interpretable; they show that, on average, the low, high, and random distortions had decreasing levels of similarity to the study exemplars, as would be expected given the statistical distortion techniques used to construct the patterns (and as we have verified in previous scaling work). In addition, the estimated criterion settings were very similar across the CAT and LAX




Fig. 1. (A) Examples of the study and test patterns presented in each task. (B) Proportion of endorsements for each of the pattern types in each of the tasks.

**Table 1. Best-fitting parameters from the exemplar model**

Parameter	Value
$S_L$	0.023
$S_H$	0.012
$S_R$	0.004
$K_{Cat}$	0.053
$K_{Lax}$	0.067
$K_{Rec}$	0.246

tasks, but a much stricter criterion setting operated in the REC task.

**Brain Imaging Analyses**

**Analytic Approach.** For the fMRI analyses, we focus on the planned comparisons of most direct theoretical relevance. Note that, across all three tasks, the “old” and “random” test items have the same correct-response status. That is, for all three of the CAT, REC, and LAX tasks, the correct answer is to endorse “old” items but reject the “random” ones. Thus, the old–random item comparison holds fixed across conditions both the test stimuli and their associated correct responses, while varying only the task and hypothesized parameter settings. If similar patterns of brain activation are observed for both old and random items across the REC and LAX conditions, and these patterns contrast with the CAT condition, it would provide strong evidence of distinct neural processes underlying recognition vs. categorization, regardless of specific parameter settings. Furthermore, if these differences occur in brain regions implicated in memory, it would be convincing evidence for the multiple memory systems view. By contrast, if similar patterns of brain activation are observed across the CAT and LAX conditions, and they contrast with the REC condition, it would suggest a critical role of criterion parameter settings in influencing the patterns of brain activity.

Thus, we conducted whole-brain analyses of variance using as factors task (CAT, LAX, REC) and item type (old, random). To focus on results that are likely to be highly replicable, we use a stringent voxel-wise threshold with family wise error (FWE) correction for multiple tests ( $\alpha < 0.05$ ), and do not report cases in which only a single voxel from a region met this criterion. (We also occasionally discuss results from a more lenient threshold that uses a voxel-wise  $P$  value of 0.001 and a cluster-size threshold of 10 voxels.)


**Table 2. Description of clusters found with targeted contrasts**

Contrast	Effect	Region label	Coordinates	Brodmann area	Cluster size	Peak Z
CAT/LAX vs. REC	Task	—	—	—	—	—
	Pattern type	—	—	—	—	—
	Interaction	AIC	+32 +23 -8	13/47	3	5.0
		FEF	-26 -5 +52	6	8	5.4
REC/LAX vs. CAT	Task	ACC	-11 +28 +10	24	10	5.2
	Pattern type	—	—	—	—	—
	Interaction	—	—	—	—	—

All clusters were significant at a FWE-corrected level ( $\alpha < 0.05$ ). Coordinates are relative to the MNI template. Cluster size is  $k_c$ .


**CAT/LAX vs. REC Contrast.** The most incisive analyses were focused contrast analyses comparing  $(CAT + LAX)/2$  to REC and  $(REC + LAX)/2$  to CAT. The  $(CAT + LAX)/2$  vs. REC comparison (which should be sensitive to parameter changes) revealed highly interpretable effects (Fig. 2 A and B and Table 2). Using the stringent threshold, we observed a significant interaction between  $(CAT + LAX)/2$  vs. REC and old vs. random items in the frontal eye field (FEF; -26, -5, 52) and the right anterior insular cortex (AIC; 32, 23, -8). Past research suggests that both areas are associated with forms of evidence accumulation in tasks of perceptual decision-making (26–30).

According to the present theoretical account, the major difference between CAT/LAX and REC is that a more lenient decision criterion is established in the former conditions than the latter. As illustrated schematically in Fig. 3, an implication is that evidence accumulation favoring positive responses to old items should proceed more efficiently in the CAT/LAX conditions than in REC, because the summed similarity for old items exceeds the criterion to a greater extent in the former conditions. Analogously, evidence accumulation favoring negative responses to the random items should proceed more efficiently in REC than in CAT/LAX. The interaction effect (which measures whether the old–random difference changes across the CAT/LAX and REC conditions) arises from the combination of these factors. These interaction effects are summarized in Fig. 2B, which shows that in both FEF and AIC, the difference in BOLD percent signal



**Fig. 2.** (A) Whole-brain map of the interaction between task and item type. Effects are shown from the CAT/LAX vs. REC contrast. The map is shown at a minimum statistical threshold of  $P < 0.001$ ; however, the two clusters identified by the arrows were also significant using an FWE-corrected threshold. The  $t$  values corresponding to these two thresholds are indicated on the color legend.  $Y$  values indicate coordinates of the coronal slices relative to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template. (B) BOLD percent signal change of the FEF and AIC in each task (difference effect for the old vs. the random patterns).





**Fig. 3.** Schematic illustration of how evidence accumulation relates to criterion placement according to the summed-similarity exemplar model.


change for the old–random items was negative in the CAT and LAX conditions, but positive in the REC condition. The forms of evidence accumulation may correspond to the gathering of perceptual information in the case of FEF, and to both modal and amodal forms of evidence accumulation, such as occurs in sequential sampling models of decision making (10, 26, 27, 29, 31–33), in the case of FEF and AIC.

In sum, a significant part of the difference between the brain activation patterns yielded by perceptual categorization and standard old–new recognition is the result of changes in parameter settings. In particular, for the present paradigm, the brain activity differences appear to be related to differences in the efficiency of evidence accumulation resulting from changed criterion settings across the tasks.

To bolster this interpretation, we conducted modeling analyses at the individual-subject level and related the results from these analyses to the brain imaging results. For simplicity, we held the estimated similarity parameters (Table 1) fixed across all conditions and subjects, and computed the values of the criterion parameter  $K$  from Eq. 1 that provided maximum-likelihood fits to each individual subject’s data in each individual condition. We then computed the correlation between these individual-subject criterion settings ( $K$ ) and the subjects’ old–random brain activation differences within each of the individual task conditions.

Note that the results from our between-task contrast analyses revealed a positive relation between the magnitude of  $K$  and the old–random brain activations in both FEF and AIC (Table 1 and Fig. 2B). Therefore, the prior (directional) hypothesis from our account is that there should be a positive correlation between the individual-subject estimates of  $K$  and the old–random brain activations within each task. The correlations were statistically significant for AIC in the CAT condition [ $r(16) = 0.471, P < 0.05$ ], AIC in the LAX condition [ $r(16) = 0.593, P < 0.05$ ], and FEF in the REC condition [ $r(16) = 0.410, P < 0.05$ , one-tailed directional hypothesis]. The correlations went in the same positive direction for AIC in the REC condition and for FEF in both the CAT and LAX conditions, but were smaller in magnitude and did not reach statistical significance [mean  $r(16) = 0.359$ ]. In further analyses, we computed average values of old–random activation across FEF and AIC to create an “accumulation network” aggregate score for each subject. The correlations between the individual-subject  $K$  estimates and these aggregate brain activity scores were all significant [ $r(16) = 0.602$  for CAT ( $P < 0.01$ );  $r(16) = 0.553$  for LAX ( $P < 0.02$ ); and  $r(16) = 0.472$  for REC ( $P < 0.05$ )].

Because each analysis involves a reduced range of the criterion parameter (i.e., most subjects set a low criterion in the CAT and LAX conditions but a strict criterion in the REC condition), finding these positive correlations within each task provides strong support for the hypothesis that the present brain activation differences between categorization and recognition are driven by changes in parameter settings.



**Fig. 4.** Scatterplots of old–random BOLD percent signal change against criterion parameter estimates ( $\log K$ ) for all individual subjects in all task conditions.

The systematic relations described above are illustrated in Fig. 4, which plots the old–random brain activity differences against  $\log K$  for all subjects in all conditions. (We use the log transformation for this illustration because many of the  $K$  estimates were compressed toward zero in the CAT and LAX conditions.) As expected, Fig. 4 reveals that, in both AIC and FEF,  $K$  estimates and old–random brain activity differences both tend to be greater in the REC condition than in the CAT and LAX conditions. Impressively, despite the reduced ranges, this positive relation between  $K$  and the brain activity differences is seen within each of the tasks as well.

Finally, in a more exploratory approach, we constructed correlation maps of brain activity. These maps were developed by conducting whole-brain analyses based on correlations between the individual-subject  $K$  parameters and the old–random BOLD percent signal change at every voxel (*SI Text*). These maps produced results that converged with the results from our (CAT + LAX)/2 vs. REC contrast analyses. In particular, strong correlations were again observed in AIC and FEF. As described in depth in *SI Text* and Fig. S1, the maps also pointed to other brain regions that past work suggests are associated with criterion setting and evidence accumulation in decision making, including areas of posterior parietal cortex as well as the caudate (27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35). Overall, therefore, there is strong converging support for the idea that changes in activity in the neural networks responsible for categorization and recognition reflect changes in parameter settings.

**REC/LAX vs. CAT Contrast.** The REC/LAX vs. CAT contrast asks whether there are any brain regions sensitive to the process of recognition that differ from those that mediate categorization, once changes in criterion settings across the tasks are removed. This analysis revealed no interactions between task and item type (old vs. random), regardless of whether the strict or the lenient statistical threshold was applied. This null result is consistent with the exemplar model hypothesis that the present forms of categorization and recognition recruit the same memory system.

Interestingly, however, the analysis did reveal a main effect of task in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC;  $-11\ 28\ 10$ ; Table 2). The effect was seen most strongly near the intersection of the dorsal and ventral divisions of the ACC. Its posterior location, near to corpus callosum, suggests strongly that the activation is generated in Brodmann’s area 24, implying the dorsal division. Although unanticipated by the exemplar model hypothesis, a possible explanation is the following: Past research suggests that dorsal ACC is sensitive to the anticipation of error likelihood or more general forms of response conflict (36, 37). Although corrective feedback was not provided in our design, it is clear that in the standard and lax recognition conditions, there are objective right and wrong answers about whether a test item is an exact

match to some study item. By contrast, in the case of categorization, the situation is fuzzier. That is, in the absence of corrective feedback, whether an item should be called a member of a category is a more open-ended type of judgment, and assignment of error is more arbitrary. Thus, rather than reflecting qualitatively different systems, the main effect of recognition vs. categorization in ACC may reflect a quantitative difference in anticipation of error likelihood. One approach to testing this hypothesis would be to conduct designs in which corrective feedback is provided for all tasks. If an observer learns that there are clear, objective right and wrong answers associated with the categorization judgments, then similar patterns of ACC activation should be observed across the CAT, LAX, and REC conditions.

Regardless of the merits of the error-anticipation hypothesis, it is important to keep in perspective our key theoretical proposal. The key idea is that categorization and recognition may rely on similar cognitive processes and memory representations involving largely overlapping neural systems. It would be too strong to claim that there are no differences between the cognitive and neural processes that mediate categorization and recognition. However, these differences may be smaller than suggested by influential separate systems accounts, which posit that categorization and recognition recruit separate memory systems. To our knowledge, none of these accounts have pointed to this region of ACC as a major locus of such separate memory systems.

**ROI analysis in POC.** As noted previously, in their categorization task, Reber et al. (22) found that category members were associated with decreased activity in POC compared with non-members, an effect termed the “category fluency effect” (11, 20). By contrast, in Reber et al.’s (22) recognition task, old items led to increased activity in this region compared with new items. There were important procedural differences between our study and the one conducted by Reber et al. (22). Nevertheless, as reported in *SI Text* and *Fig. S2*, an ROI analysis comparing old–random activity levels in this same region of POC in our study yielded the same pattern of results as observed by Reber et al. (22). Crucially, however, the same ROI analysis revealed that the brain imaging data from our LAX condition more closely matched the results from our CAT condition, not the REC condition (see *Fig. S2* for details); therefore, POC activity levels may be sensitive to changed parameter settings as well. Future research is needed to ascertain the basis for these interesting effects.

## Discussion

**Conclusions.** In contrast to the prevailing view in the field, our study suggests that when stimulus conditions and hypothesized parameter settings are held roughly constant across the tasks, perceptual categorization and old–new recognition are mediated by largely overlapping neural memory systems. Past evidence that categorization and recognition are mediated by separate systems may have been a reflection of changed stimulus conditions, adaptive changes in parameter settings, or both. The results from our behavioral data, formal modeling analyses, and brain imaging analyses are consistent with theoretical proposals that perceptual categorization and recognition are governed by similar representations and processes, with systematic changes in parameter settings occurring across the tasks.

Support for the parameter-change interpretation was obtained from several converging sources of evidence. First, a baseline version of an exemplar model provided a good quantitative account of the choice probabilities from all of the categorization and recognition conditions, simply by allowing for systematic changes in parameter settings. Second, analysis of the averaged data indicated that differences in brain activity patterns across the categorization and recognition tasks were interpretable in terms of changes in evidence accumulation arising from changes in criterion settings. Third, modeling analyses conducted at the

individual subject level revealed significant correlations between the estimated criterion settings and these brain activity patterns within the individual conditions.

Although the major form of hypothesized parameter change was a change in criterion settings, the full version of the exemplar model presumes that other forms of parameter change may occur as well. Most notably, people may attend selectively to component dimensions of stimuli, causing changes in similarity relations across tasks (6). For example, in categorization, people tend to focus attention on the subset of dimensions that is most characteristic of the category members; whereas in recognition, they may spread attention to other dimensions for purposes of making fine-grained discriminations between old and new items (7). To obtain a fuller understanding of the neural processes that underlie categorization and recognition, future research will need to track the brain regions that implement these selective attention processes.

**Limits to Generality.** Several factors limit the generality of our conclusion that categorization and recognition are mediated by largely overlapping cognitive and neural processes. First, we are referring to similarity-based forms of “prototype extraction” in which a single category is learned from induction over exemplars and without corrective feedback. We focused on such a task because it is perhaps the major one that has been used in past work to argue that separate systems mediate categorization and recognition (11). More elaborate versions of the exemplar model have been applied to designs that involve multiple categories and learning with feedback (5–7, 10).

Second, the present conditions were tested in a within-subjects design. Although our instructions made clear that each task was new and independent, subjects may nevertheless have adopted similar strategies because the tasks were juxtaposed, perhaps even adopting a categorization strategy in the LAX condition. In a preliminary attempt to address this concern, we conducted analyses involving the order in which the tasks were tested (see *SI Text* for details). These analyses revealed that the patterns of brain activity observed in the LAX condition were extremely similar, regardless of whether LAX was tested before or after CAT (*Fig. S3*). Furthermore, ROI analyses in AIC, FEF, and ACC revealed reasonably similar patterns of brain activity across the CAT, LAX, and REC conditions in the first and second halves of the testing session (*Fig. S4*). Nevertheless, for purposes of generality, future research should test similar conditions in between-subjects designs.

Third, even when holding stimulus conditions and hypothesized parameter settings constant, we did observe brain activity differences in ACC across the categorization and recognition conditions. One possible interpretation is that these results reflect differences in anticipation of error likelihood across the tasks. However, future research needs to test this interpretation.

Although no single study can be definitive, the present work reopens the interesting possibility that perceptual categorization and old–new recognition are mediated by similar cognitive and neural systems, with only adaptive parameter changes arising across tasks.

## Methods

**Behavioral Protocol.** Eighteen right-handed college students (11 females) participated for monetary compensation. Subjects provided informed written consent in accord with the policies of the Indiana University Humans Subjects Review Board.

For each subject and task, a novel random dot-pattern prototype was generated (24). Statistical distortion procedures (24) were then used to generate five old high distortions of the prototype, four new low distortions, 12 new high distortions, and 20 new random patterns. During the study phase, there were three blocks in which each of the old distortions was presented in a random order for 5,000 ms each. During the test phase, each old distortion was presented four times, and each of the new

distortions and random patterns was presented once. Stimuli were presented in random order with a variable interval between the onset of the stimulus and the start of the next trial based on random exponentially distributed jitter (4,000, 6,000, or 8,000 ms). Each stimulus was presented for 2,000 ms with a blank interval for the remainder of the randomly generated time period. In all tasks during the study phase, subjects were instructed to simply view the patterns, and the instructions made clear that new questions would be asked about the patterns at the time of test. The test instructions were as described in the text. Subjects participated in each task twice in two separate series of the three tasks. A Latin Square was used

to balance the ordering of the CAT, LAX, and REC conditions in the first series, and a separate Latin Square was used to balance the ordering in the second series.

**Imaging Procedures.** Details of imaging and statistical analysis methods are provided in *SI Text*.

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